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Abstract—Software-defined networking (SDN) promises to im-
prove the programmability and flexibility of networks, but it
may bring also new challenges that need to be explored. The
purpose of this technical report is to assess how the deployment
of the SDN controllers affects the overall availability of SDN.
For this, we have varied the number, homing and location of
SDN controllers. A two-level modelling approach that is used to
evaluate the availability of the studied scenarios. Our results show
how network operators can use the approach to find the optimal
cost implied by the connectivity of the SDN control platform by
keeping high levels of availability.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the recent years, the SDN has emerged as a new
network paradigm, which mainly consists of a programmable
network approach where the forwarding plane is decoupled
from the control plane [1], [2]. Despite programmable net-
works having been studied for decades, SDN is experiencing a
growing success because it is expected that the ease of chang-
ing protocols and provide support for adding new services
and applications will foster future network innovation, which
is limited and expensive in todays legacy systems.
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Fig. 1. SDN architecture (exclusive the management plane)
A simplified sketch of the SDN architecture from IRFT
RFC 7426 [1] without the management plane is depicted in
Figure 1. The control plane and data plane are separated. Here
the control plane is logically centralised in a software-based
controller (“network brain”), while the data plane is composed
of the network devices (“network arms”) that conduct the
packet forwarding.
The control plane has a northbound and a southbound inter-
face. The northbound interface provides an network abstraction
to the network applications (e.g. routing protocol, firewall, load
balancer, anomaly detection, etc...), while the southbound in-
terface (e.g. OpenFlow) standardises the information exchange
between control and data planes.
In [3], the following set of potential advantages of SDN
were pointed out:
• centralised control;
• simplified algorithms;
• commoditising network hardware;
• eliminating middle-boxes;
• enabling the design and deployment of third-party appli-
cations.
However, from a dependability perspective, the SDN poses
a set of new vulnerabilities and challenges compared with
traditional networking, as discussed in [4]:
• consistency of network information (user plane state
information) and controller decisions;
• consistency between the distributed SDN controllers in
the control plane;
• increased failure intensities of (commodity) network ele-
ments;
• compatibility and interoperability between general pur-
pose, non-standard network elements
• interdependency between path setup in network elements
and monitoring of the data plane in the control plane;
• load sharing (to avoid performance bottleneck) and fault
tolerance in the control plane have conflicting require-
ments;
The objective of this technical report are to compare the
overall availability of SDN when the number, homing and
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location of SDN controllers are varied. Note that this work
needs to be intent as a preliminary study of [5].
that may be achieved with SDN to that of a traditional
IP routed network and to investigate under which parametric
condition one is better than the other. In order to do this, we
introduce a two level modelling approach, where the top-level
catches the structural properties of the networks, and the lower
layer the dependability characteristics of the different network
elements/subsystems under hardware, software and operational
model. The models of network elements/subsystems in the
two kinds of networks are developed in order to maintain
similarities and establish a parametric relation.
In Section II, we introduce the two-level hierarchical model
that has been used in this study. The evaluation of the
deployment of the SDN controllers has reported in Section III.
Finally, the conclusions are summarized in Section IV.
II. MODELLING
A two-levels model (initially introduced in [6] and then
extended [5]) is used to evaluate the dependability of SDN in a
global network. In particular, the dependability is measured in
terms of steady state availability, in the following referred to as
availability. The two-level hierarchical availability modelling
approach consists of:
• Structural model of the network topology;
• Dynamic model of network elements.
The approach seeks to avoid the potential uncontrolled growth
in model size by compromising the need for modelling de-
tails and at the same time modelling a (very) large scale
network. The detailed modelling is necessary to capture the
dependencies that exists between network elements, and to
described multiple failure modes that might be found in
some of the network elements and in the controllers. The
structural model disregards this and assumes independence
between the components considered, where a component can
be either a single network element with one failure mode, or
a set of elements that are interdependent and/or experience
several failure modes with an advanced recovery strategy.
For the dynamic models we can use a Markov model or
Stochastic Petrinet (e.g., Stochastic Reward Network [7]). For
the structural model we can use reliability block diagram, fault
trees, or structure functions based on minimal cut or path sets.
The objective of the modelling approach is to compare the
availability of SDN with a traditional IP network with the same
topology of network elements (SDN forwarding switched and
IP routers).
III. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this evaluation we consider the national backbone net-
work depicted in Figure 2 and consists of 10 nodes across 4
cities, and two dual-homed SDN controllers. The nodes are
located in the four major cities in Norway, Bergen (BRG),
Trondheim (TRD), Stavanger (STV), and Oslo (OSL). Each
town has duplicated nodes, except Oslo which has four nodes
(OSL1 and OSL2). The duplicated nodes are labelled, X1
and X2, where X=OSL1, OSL2, BRG, STV, and TRD. In
addition to the forwarding nodes, there are two dual-homed
SDN controllers (SC1 and SC2), which are connected to TRD
and OSL1.
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Fig. 2. Topology of the nation-wide backbone network
We assume that nodes, links, and controllers in the system
may fail. The peering traffic in a city is routed through an
access and metro network with a connection to both (all four)
nodes in the city. The system is working (up), when all the
access and metro networks are connected. Note that for SDN,
at least one controller must be reachable from all nodes along
a working path.
To evaluate the availability of traditional networks and SDN,
we consider the same typical parameters used in [5], which
are inspired by and taken from several studies [8], [9], [10].
To evaluate the impact of the connectivity and the redun-
dancy of the SDN controllers in the national backbone network
we consider the following case studies:
1) There is only one controller and it is connected to
OSL12;
2) There are two single-homed controllers (SC1 connected
to TRD2 and SC2 connected to OSL12);
3) Reference scenario depicted in Figure 2;
4) The controllers are triple-homed (added connections
from SC1 to BRG1 and from SC2 to BRG2 to the
reference scenario);
5) The controllers are quadruple-homed (added connections
from SC1 to STV1 and from SC2 to STV2 to the
previous scenario);
6) There are three controllers (added controller connected
to BRG1 and to BRG2 to the reference scenario);
7) There are four controllers (added controller connected
to STV1 and to STV2 to the previous scenario);
(a) Case 1 (b) Case 2
(c) Case 3 (d) Case 4
(e) Case 5 (f) Case 6
(g) Case 7 (h) Case 8
Fig. 3. Unavailability by varying αs in the different connectivity and redundancy configurations
8) There is one dual-homed controller (deleted SC2 from
the reference scenario).
Figure 3 shows the unavailability of SDN in the case studies.
In the figure the αX factors where X = S,H,O,C, which
affect the intensity of the related failure sources (software, αS ,
hardware, αH , O&M, αO, and coverage, αC) and are defined
as follows:
• αH =
λH
N/K λdC
;
• αS =
λS
N λdS
;
• αO =
λO
N λdO
.
A. Evaluating SDN controller connectivity
To evaluate the impact of the SDN controllers connectivity
in the national backbone network we consider the case studies
2, 3, 4, and 5.
Figures 3(c), 3(d), and 3(e) highlight that the unavailability
in the cases 3, 4, and 5 is almost the same, so having a
triple- or quadruple-homed controller would not enhance the
availability performance but would increase the deployment
cost especially if inter-city connections are needed. The most
critical case is of course the case 1 when there is just one
single-homed controller, in this case the unavailability in
increased by one order of magnitude. The difference between
cases 2 and 3 (better depicted in Figure 4) is really small, this
is likely due to the high availability of the links.
B. Evaluating SDN controller redundancy
To evaluate the impact of the SDN controllers redundancy
in the national backbone network we consider the case studies
3, 6, 7, and 8.
Figures 3(c) and 3(h) show the network availability in
the case with two dual-homed controllers and the case with
one dual-homed controller. the comparison highlights that the
unavailability with one controller is from one to two orders of
magnitude higher than the unavailability with two controller
and two orders magnitude higher that the unavailability of the
traditional network.
Figures 3(f) and 3(g) show that the unavailability in the
cases of three and four dual-homed controllers is lower than
the unavailability of the traditional network. Figure 5 high-
lights that the unavailability with three and four controllers is
on the same order of magnitude and two orders of magnitude
lower than both traditional network and the SDN with two
controllers.
C. Evaluating SDN controller location
Figure 6 shows that the unavailability of SDN does not
change by varying the location of the SDN controller. We note
only a minor increase when one of the controller is connected
to OSL1, we suppose that is because OSL1 belongs to Oslo
that is the only city with 4 nodes. Anyway, the problem of
SDN controller placement should be more deeply analysed in
a larger and more complex network.
(a) Case 2
(b) Case 3
Fig. 4. Unavailability by varying αs in the different connectivity configura-
tions (zoomed version)
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this technical report, we have evaluated how the overall
availability of SDN is influenced by the number, homing and
location of SDN controllers. The results show that having a
triple- or quadruple-homed controller would not enhance the
availability performance, but would unnecessary increase the
deployment cost to be made by operators. Single-homing has
reduced the availability as wall but the impact is limited. Com-
paring the number of SDN controllers, one SDN controller
is not enough to guarantee an acceptable availability. Two
controllers allows the SDN to have an availability comparable
to the traditional network. Instead, three and four controller
permit to obtain a really low unavailability but the deployment
cost may be excessive to a network operator, which target
is to provide an availability similar to the current traditional
network. In the addressed study, the location of the SDN
controllers has not influence on the overall availability.
(a) Case 6
(b) Case 7
Fig. 5. Unavailability by varying αs in the different redundancy configurations
(zoomed version)
Fig. 6. Unavailability by varying the location of the SDN controllers (αS = 1,
αH = 1, αO = 0.2, and αC = 1)
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